[1]武明虎,万其轩,赵 楠.基于契约理论的移动众包网络长期激励机制研究[J].湖北工业大学学报,2020,(2):28-31+36.
　WU Minghu,WAN Qixuan,ZHAO Nan.Research on Long-term Incentive Mechanism of Mobile Crowdsourcing Network Based on Contract Theory[J].,2020,(2):28-31+36.
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基于契约理论的移动众包网络长期激励机制研究()
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《湖北工业大学学报》[ISSN:1003-4684/CN:42-1752/Z]

卷:
期数:
2020年第2期
页码:
28-31+36
栏目:
出版日期:
2020-04-30

文章信息/Info

Title:
Research on Long-term Incentive Mechanism of Mobile Crowdsourcing Network Based on Contract Theory
文章编号:
1003-4684(2020)02-0028-04
作者:
武明虎1; 万其轩1; 赵  楠2
1 湖北工业大学，太阳能高效利用与储能系统运行控制湖北省重点实验室，湖北 武汉 430068；
2 湖北工业大学， 湖北省太阳能高效利用协同创新中心，湖北 武汉 430068
Author(s):
WU Minghu1; WAN Qixuan1; ZHAO Nan2
1 Hubei Key Laboratory for High-efficiency Utilization of Solar Energy and Operation Control of Energy Storage System, Hubei Univ. of Tech., Wuhan 430068, China；
2 Hubei Collaborative Innovation Center for High-efficiency Utilization of Solar Energy, Hubei Univ. of Tech., Wuhan 430068, China
关键词:
移动众包网络;  信息非对称;  激励机制;  契约理论
Keywords:
mobile crowdsourcing network;  information asymmetry;  incentive mechanism;  contract theory
分类号:
TN929.52
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
针对移动众包网络中网络信息非对称的问题和移动众包任务参与者的自私性，提出一种基于契约的移动众包网络的长期激励机制。考虑到移动众包任务参与者的移动性和环境的动态特性，在建立软件服务商和移动用户模型基础上，研究两阶段动态契约激励模型。在移动用户满足激励相容和参与约束条件下，通过甄别移动用户完成移动众包任务的真实众包任务努力的能力，实现软件服务商期望效用最大化。实验结果表明，该机制能够有效提高移动众包网络的共享性能，为移动众包的发展提供新思路。
Abstract:
Aiming at the problem of asymmetric network information in mobile crowdsourcing networks and the selfishness of participants in mobile crowdsourcing tasks, a long-term incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsourcing networks based on contracts is proposed. Considering the mobility of the mobile crowdsourcing task participants and the dynamic characteristics of the environment, a two-stage dynamic contract incentive model is studied on the basis of establishing a software service provider and mobile user model. Under the conditions that mobile users meet the incentive compatibility and participation constraints, by identifying the true capabilities of mobile users’ real mobile crowdsourcing efforts, the expected utility of software service providers is maximized. Experimental results show that this mechanism can effectively improve the sharing performance of mobile crowdsourcing networks and provide new ideas for the development of mobile crowdsourcing.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
［收稿日期］ 2019-11-13
［基金项目］ 湖北省教育厅科研计划教育（T201805）； 重大技术创新湖北项目（2018AAA028号）
［第一作者］ 武明虎(1975-)， 男， 湖北巴东人，湖北工业大学教授，研究方向为信号与信息处理
［通信作者］ 万其轩(1994-)， 男， 湖北武汉人，湖北工业大学硕士研究生，研究方向为控制理论与控制工程
更新日期/Last Update: 2020-05-13